CHAPTER THREE

FROM ARTS VENUES TO PERCIPIENCE TO POETIC THINKING TO POETRY WRITING IN THE COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY

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Theory suggests that the mind is a muted instrument without symbolic notation. One might think that a symbolic language tool, such as poetry, would, therefore, be used to help cultivate the thoughts of children in schools. However, several say that this may not be the case at all. In this chapter, I explore the possibility of using the visual arts and then poetry as an entrance to philosophical inquiry within a community of inquiry (CI) with school children. To reach the poetical, I explore the use of regional art venues as cultural, archival resources for fostering percipience. This is done to enter into the aesthetic and immutable via poetic thinking to cultivate this thinking into language and the other somatic effects of poetry. This poetry may then be used to foster inquiry within a CI. I do not cover the curriculum of using a CI approach but focus rather on the philosophy and theory of percipience, poetic thinking, and the poetry writing path.

Several theories of the powerful interplay of thought and language may suggest that the mind is a muted instrument without the feature of symbolic notation (Britton, 1970; Moffet, 1968; Tremmel, 1992; Vygotsky, 1962). One might think, in turn, that a symbolic language tool, such as poetry, would be employed to help cultivate the thoughts of children in schools. However, several suggest that this may not be the case at all. In fact, within the active curriculum of teaching thinking and writing, lessons that include the writing of poetry are very hard to find. Chomsky (2006), citing Schlegel, called the function of creative imagination in any aesthetic effort "poetical" (p. 90). Still, poetic thinking, thinking regarding any

aesthetic experience or creation, is scarcer (Greene, 2001; Halliburton, 1981; McCarthy, 2004; Robinson, 2001; Tremmel, 1992).

Artistic thinking and its expression are at a distance from most mainstream school curricula; similarly, poetic thinking and writing are on the outskirts of any center of focus (Greene, 1978, 1988, 2001; McCarthy, 2004; Robinson, 2001; Tremmel, 1992). Primarily, it seems that poetic thinking and writing have hardly a foot in the door past early grammar school (Tremmel, 1992). This was confirmed for me by my own experience working in the arts in New Jersey schools for the past 25 years, through discussions with my colleagues (R. Carnevale, personal communication, 2005; Doty, personal communication, 2006; Niccolletti, personal communication, 2008), and through many state documents on the subject (Pinzolo, 2008; Schmid, 2008).

This may be because the perceived knowledge acquisitions that appear to be related to poetry are associated with learning that rests far away from the central focus of most language arts curricula (Tremmel, 1992). Moreover, this may be because the main foci of language arts are concept, critical thinking, solutions, and analysis. One wry wrench in the paradigm is that language arts has been removed far enough from its aesthetic origins to be officially stripped of its arts badge (Greene, 1978, 1988; McCarthy, 2004; Robinson, 2001; Tremmel, 1992). It turns out that those concerned with middle and secondary school students' poetic thinking and writing are simply scarce poets who come to teach and not researchers, testers, or perhaps even teachers (McCarthy, 2004; Robinson, 2001; Tremmel, 1992).

In education, art remains the subordinate curriculum. However, much literature highlights how poetic thinking may be an undivided participant of all thinking (Alexander, 1992; Applebee, 1978; Bosch, 1998; Bruner, 1996; Burns, 1989; Dewey, 1980, 1997; Donaldson, 1978; Fleckenstein, 1999, 2003; Gardner, 1988; Greene, 1988; Heidegger, 1971; Jacob, 1922; Jakobson, 1985c; Kant, 1952; Lakoff, 1987; Langer, 1953; Lipman, 1980; Makkreel & Rodi, 1985; Martin, 1975; Robinson, 2001; Stewart, 1995; Szondi, 1986; Tremmel, 1992).

This paradigmatic resting point of poetry as subordinate may have something to do with the fact that in Piaget's broad theory of pedagogy, there is basically no account of poetic thinking and writing (Tremmel, 1992). Even citing others himself, Vygotsky (1962) suggested that poetry is simply inseparable from music, whereas the predominant elements of prose are thought and language. Still, Osborn (1971) said, "if education can aid in the cultivation of aesthetic percipience, the major part of its task has been achieved" (p. 28).

Another challenge is that poetic thinking may be difficult to evaluate objectively, and this may be a reason that it is only on the periphery of school curricula. It is difficult to assess because it is composed mostly of personal involvement, which is, therefore, not standardized (Bonnett, 1991).

In Western European cultures, some suggest that analytic thinking and writing are privileged as they seek a scientific truth or technical facts. This seems to be a rife habit of mind in the West (Arendt, 1978; Polanyi, 1962; Tremmel, 1992). However, the division between poetic writing and thinking and academic writing and analytic thinking may not be a division at all because poetic thinking is a feat of language and has a part in analysis (Tremmel, 1992). What is more, through poetry, we may help develop "an ineffable flush of energetic excitation…spur[ing children]…to think beyond habitual limits" (Shusterman, 1997).

Still, in a more open educational ecosphere, this might suggest a useful difference between dialogue and monologue; poetry insists on a dialogue, sonically and somatically, and prose may serve as a monologue medium with its emission of ideas and ordinary conversational parole. However, an overriding theoretical dependency on Piaget is not Piaget's problem but rather the limitation of the thinking habits of those in educational leadership (Tremmel, 1992).

In this chapter, I explore the possibility of using the visual arts and then poetry as an entrance into philosophical inquiry within a community of inquiry (CI) with school children. However, to reach the poetical, I first traverse the use of regional art venues as cultural, archival resources to foster percipience. This is done to enter into the aesthetic and immutable via poetic thinking to cultivate this thinking into the language and other somatic effects of poetry. This poetry may then be used to foster inquiry within a CI. However, I do not discuss here a curriculum using this approach in a CI, but rather, I focus on the philosophy and theory of the percipience, poetic thinking, and poetry writing path.

The CI has been explained in much of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) literature (Lipman, 2003; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980). However, for the purposes of this chapter, let it suffice to say that a CI has a structure and rules that prevent it from haphazardness. A CI also usually follows a democratic approach to inquiry (Lipman et al., 1980). In essence, a CI attempts to fulfill the need to know reality in the best way. Whereas the individual is unable to reach reality sufficiently, a CI follows inquiry in a communal manner. In this way, Raposa citing Peirce suggests the individual with the group may determine what he or she believes, at the time, to be a reasonable case of truth (Raposa, 1989).

What Can the Arts Actually Do for Children's Education?

Although conflicting theories may be a restriction of the arts in education, recent research suggests that early involvement in arts activities may actually enhance cognitive skills. For instance, performance within groups may help children to develop higher levels of motivation and improve performance elsewhere (Gazzaniga, 2008). This suggests that a CI might serve as an opportunity for this development. Furthermore, experience developing music through composition may help students further manipulate information (Jonides, 2008). I discuss later the fact that poetry does contain its element of music and may be another way for children to grow in the area of language manipulation. Other recent research indicates that correlations may exist between the rhythm, meter, and rhyme of poetry and music and early literacy and phonology (Dunbar, 2008). Also, some research suggests that the manipulation of semantics may also improve memory (Posner, Rothbart, Sheese, & Kieras, 2008).

However, perhaps more importantly, Gazzaniga (2008) suggested that research on how the arts improve cognition may be life affirming, in that we may learn how to learn, think about thinking (e.g., Lipman, 1980, 2003), and improve the fecundity of our lives. In particular, the art of writing poetry may be not just a mode of life but also a pivotal device for developing the self; in other words, poetry is life affirming as part of the art of living (Shusterman, 1997).

To take action that might merit much positive attention toward the arts and cognition and its mixing of presentation and the discursive, Gardner (1988) suggested that philosophy and education should act in concert with students, teachers, poets, and other artists. The concept of art, others have affirmed, should be an important part of education in collaboration with math, science, geography, and history. That is, if it properly occupies a space in the curriculum, art may help us view the world from a different perspective and may serve as a bridge to other disciplines (Hanks, 1971).

Why is It Important?

Because we aspire to satisfy the significance of our existence, the aesthetics of our being may be a metaphysical imperative (Alexander, 1992). Theoretically, aesthetics consists of the assemblage of abridgements of earnest suggestions that are to be heeded in various ways for the many features of a piece of art (Weitz, 1956). In fact, Dewey's (1997) metaphysics, according to Alexander, is an array of caring ontology and thinking creatively about a world in a quest for its own end of the

story, the closure of the aesthetic, and the completion of its action. This metaphysics requires us to see the light through nature and a creative democracy (Alexander, 1992). With the aesthetic experience as an opening to philosophical dialogue, one might ask, as Shusterman (1997) posed, "Is improved experience, not ordinary truth…the ultimate philosophical goal and criterion?" (p. 157).

Through the creative center residing in an individual, reality and self may coalesce into a creative product (Bosch, 1998; Pascal, 1929). Furthermore, action taken to generate other creative products may occur when the creative is plaited with the actual (Alexander, 1992). However, the degree of our successful creative manufacturing requires some measurement of perceiving and judging our product.

Our scale of perception, however, tips back and forth between the linguistic exigencies of memory and creativity itself (Bosch, 1998).

The creative product for the purposes of this chapter may be a poem produced by what I will call the *child poet/philosopher*, that is, a child within a CI group who has generated poetry and then uses it within a CI dialogue to open more philosophical inquiry.

What Is the Poem?

Art is presented via a particular medium, which could be film, web sites, dance, sculpture, painting, or poetry. Poetry then is a medium. The basis of the poetry medium is language with language or, as Chomsky (2006) called it, "an expression of the human mind" (p. 90). This means that poetry is not a product of nature. As a result, poetry may have an otherwise unlimited framework with which to play. In fact, poetry may be constructed recursively; this means that each poem may lead to another entirely new poem (Chomsky, 2006). For the poetic creative act and for others, there is a need for the cognitive tools of intention and imagination. However, the intentional will of the utterance of the poem does not take precedence over the poet's imagination, as it is a tool bearing a more adaptable impetus (O'Brien, 1993). However, where does this imagination originate? O'Brien seemed to suggest that Aristotle (2000) in *De anmima III.3* found imagination to be a pure output of sensory perception.

Assemblage of Parts

A poem as creative product may be an assemblage of imaginative intellectual possibilities. It might contain highlighted facts or data, such as colors, names, movement verbs, or historical information. However, these

data are only broken pieces until they are assembled and collaged into a complete whole, a poem (ew 3.8–10).

Ingredients are assembled into a sort of soup of language. Then, the oral roux of poetry, with a recipe of phonology and grammar, sets forth a broth of flavorful, elaborate correspondences. These recipes of language, however, like cultural cuisine, may appear bequeathed through generations without a conscious realization of the rules of the ethnic chef who controls this soup (Fleckenstein, 2003). Even without a recipe, theorists may be inching closer to knowing how the human mind uses language creatively (Chomsky, 2006), such as poetry. One question remains: What does someone know about language that in turn, allows that person to work with language and create a poem? There may be no reason to believe that a recipe of the rules of such language may be brought to consciousness. Introspectively, it may be possible for an experienced poet to build a limited collection of results through experimentation and study. This may lead, at least aesthetically, to an understanding of some elements of the assimilation of sound and meaning. Still, this would be only superfluous knowledge. There seems to be no theory yet to even suggest that the poet may unearth the subconscious terrain of principals and rules that formulate the sonic evocation of meaning (Chomsky, 2006).

The Venue to Perceive

At this juncture, let us turn to the percipience of a work of art that may be in a venue, such as an art museum. In this case, we will look at one of the Monet's Water Lilies series paintings (Monet, 1997). As we imaginatively behold water lilies, we may let our minds wander while observing water lilies in a pond in a new way. We may enter into what Kant (1952) called the "aesthetic experience." We may let our minds travel through a broad range of secondary meanings of water lilies in a pond (Blocker, 2005).

For instance, we may think of how quiet the lilies are in the pond seem, especially in a museum and perhaps in actuality; how even though it is often complete with slime, algae, and insects, the pond water seems glasslike and clean at a glance; and how the pond water, though a staple of life formation, takes second fiddle to the life that floats on top of it. We may also think how we do not see a horizon or even a shore line, perhaps like a focused child exploring the lilies. Finally, we may see how this painting, even without a shore line, is complete and whole (Blocker, 2005; Marceau, 1997).

Moreover, in the absence of an existing definition, we may be able to float through many possible meanings associated with the pond lilies in a "reflective judgment of taste" (Blocker, 2005, p. 32). What is more, the idea or poem that follows might express an aesthetic idea in which the mind uses creative imagination to activate reasoning (Blocker, 2005; Marceau, 1997). This is because coming to greet us as old friends—even though our experience with them may not be long—certain works of art, such as Monet's Water Lilies series, seem to supplicate our attention (Osborne, 1971). Subsequently, the perception of a work as an integrated entity is what gives it aesthetic value (Maquet, 1990). Still, developing an appreciation of art is a type of skill. Calling it a skill means that it is not just a choice through a personal penchant or an esteem for the imagery and form (Osborne, 1971).

In fact, Aristotle (2009) suggested that images are just the precursor, the required standing point for deliberate thought. However, more recently, Fleckenstein (2003) suggested that even some contemporary neuroscientists see imagery as our memoir of identity or as adhering to the human soul (p. 12). Furthermore, without imagery, we do not have the ability to generate textual meaning at all (Fleckenstein, 2003). This is because there would be no meaning in a text when there is no imagery present.

Moreover, presumably included in the progression of perception is the abstract (Bosch, 1998). This implies that perception of a painting requires more than a listing of the color and forms observed if the art is to be identified as an "act of knowledge" (Bosch, 1998). In the end, language and sensation compose perception (Bosch, 1998). However, if such language is not accessible to the perceiver, the perceived possession simply evanesces (Bosch, 1998). To maintain the percipience so that we do not, as Shakespeare suggested, "lose possession of that fair thou ow'st," the child poet/philosopher may need to coagulate the language and write a poem "So [that] long as men can breath, or eyes can see/So long lives this, and this gives life to thee" (Shakespeare, 2008). *Thee* here is the perceived possession. Percipience is the art and power to perceive keenly, to cite the immutable, and to receive the imagery ready for metaphor.

Moreover, when we first see a work of art, we may experience a quiescence of the moment. This inarticulate juncture must be acknowledged. Only then can we go to work querying for something directly, which may, in turn, liberate us from quietude, unshackling our "language machine," as Chomsky (2006) might have called it. This allows the child poet/philosopher to cipher a sentence; this then dockets an artifact of art as "eternal lines" (Shakespeare, 2008).

Still, our perception receptors themselves are remarkably ephemeral. So, as mentioned, perception is a dissipating feat requiring a foundational *raison d'être* more like tent pegs than cinderblocks. In other words, to support our percept, we may seem to mortar in some language acquired from the common wonted optical acquisitions of our art experience. However, in actuality, we raise only a temporary tent that sways in the ephemeral zephyr and is supported by a poetic patois that articulates the astonishment and effect elicited by our percept.

Perception then is acquired through a procured language but then avidly looks for its own new language (Bosch, 1998). Rorty, cited by Shusterman, further suggested that we do not warrant the language to which we are already accustomed but rather modify our language use with something new (Shusterman, 1997), so the process of perception includes the development of a new poetic perceptory patois of sorts.

Langer (1942, 1953), also attempting to identify distinctions that seem to limit curricula, pointed out the believed difference between two types of symbols, which she called *discursive* and *representational*. These are often considered to be two different plateaus. However, to cross the great notch between them, Applebee (1978) suggested that rather than simply ensuring the Piagetian model of more objective and analytic thinking, it might be important to take the subjective poetic route as well. This might help one to evoke a full-fledged view instead of an only fractional view point when only one method is pursued (Applebee, 1978). In other words, to reach wholeness, the skills of Piaget's mature thinker should blend with the aesthetics of poetry and its thinking (Applebee, 1978; Tremmel, 1992; Vygotsky, 1962). Shusterman (1997) also seemed to ask if it was necessary that the practical be in contradistinction with the aesthetic.

Fleckenstein (2003) went on to speak of a similar logic dualism, the formation of an amalgam. The "corporeal logic of the image and the discursive logic of word [are in] circular play" (p. 12); she called this *imageword*. Imageword, according to Fleckenstein, also includes the "ecological system of meaning produced by that circular dynamic" (p. 12). Still, logic may not be able to actually intone a parlance to explain grace, cadence, form, astonishment, or ardor. These are, however, indispensable elements of poetry (Lipman, 1980) and perhaps even rise above the limits of logic. Plus, without posing as the antitheses of logic, poetry may evince a sense of truth and connote meaning in a privileged manner (Hamrick, 1989).

Logic, others suggest, can hope to come to a true understanding only if it is dissolved into the poem itself. This means that the poem subsumes a logic of existence as the very product of its creative process (Adorno,

1961). This dual motif travels through the poem from beginning to end. The motif is further enmeshed within the two hemispheres of myth and nature. All of the poem's declarations about poetry and its poets then emit from the poem with the "logic peculiar to metaphor" (Szondi, 1986).

Also, a dialogue roused by the poem may further unpack this logic. The phonetic structure of a poem then may serve as a step into an inquiry dialectic, which may be richer in its discussion depth and thus allow for further thought topics (Jakobson, 1978).

This ecosystem's circular dynamic leads to the development of the child poet/philosopher into a type connoisseur for whom a true sense of appreciation is acquired in the process of perception, which Osborn (1971) called *connoisseurship*. Perceiving and discerning the merits inhabiting a piece of art is one part of this connoisseurship. However, proffering our discernment of the text of others (Osborne, 1971) and its amalgamation into our own "eternal line to time" is part of connoisseurship as well. Still, as discussed, the experience seeks its own new language. However, this new poetic dialect, the opening sentence perhaps of dialogue instigation, forms from its many parts as a kind of skittish Yiddish. That is why we need the cognitive indigenous chef of form to blend the roux and for the sound of language to cure the two epoxy chemicals, presentation and discourse.

However, I first examine the notion of the seduction of perception through works of art. The seduction begins because we expect faithfulness from art at a gallery or museum venue (Bosch, 1998). One reason for this faithfulness may be that the venue is a sacred place, a strong link between nature and its cultural art manifestation (Dewey, 1980; UNESCO, 2005). Faithfulness may then lead to analysis. Then, the nascent exclamations evoked and processed with effort allow the poet to preserve a sensation that, according to Bosch, may lure one to some subsequent inquiry (p. 33). Perceiving that a work has aesthetic qualities may be then an act of seduction (Bosch, 1998). That may be because perceiving art is a two-step process of reflexion and reflection: reflexion because what we look at, listen to, or touch comes from within us and returns to its origin and reflection because pondering then turns perception into a contemplative seduction (Bosch, 1998). The somatic experience is a powerful participant here.

In this chapter, I have discussed the need to solidify the evanescence of perception. Bosch (1998) went on to suggest that in holding onto that aesthetic, seductive embrace, we may, in turn, scuffle to mumble a phrase or other expressive sonic utterances, which may give latency to it leaving. In other words, if we quickly articulate something about the seduction, it

may linger (Bosch, 1998). However, this may be the first step for the child poet/philosopher in developing further questions regarding the experience.

Staying Online

The perception is fleeting, so to capture the vanishing wraith that we see just briefly, we need our own linguistic canvas of paper. In this way, like an artist's rendering of the evanescent bigfoot or UFO of perception, we can typographically sketch a concept into words until our poems, like social lapidaries, hew our thoughts into inquiry (Bosch, 1998). However, as Bosch said, if we do not foster a figure for the ghost of notion, it will jell into the platitudinous phrases that require much less effort than the maintenance that our pegged tent of the ephemeral requires. A work of art may then be seen as a Campbell's soup can, a customary image stuffed into the pile in the crowded garage of everyday modern life (Warhol, 1962). However, even the poetry of platitude may begin a dialogue or an inquiry.

Together

Epoxy glue is made of two different chemical compounds. They come in separate containers when purchased. The user then mixes equal portions of the two together in some kind of container. This allows for a rapid curing process, which makes the epoxy a very strong solidifier and adhesive. The somatic impact of art and the distanced words that do not quite cure our perceptions may need to be blended into a new compound to fill the empty spaces before curing. Our garden variety vocabulary, then, needs another element. the poetry of metaphor and music, which in turn, blends more with the visual and imitated somatic, which may include sonic evocations.

The bodily attraction to a subject, or somatic seduction, then turns from pleasure to emotion to language and from sensual emotional language to poetry; this may sustain such a somatic seduction in song (Bosch, 1998). The written poem then endures for the somatic, emotional, seductive moment of perception. As such, time "grow'st" and so does the perceiver/poet grow personally (Bosch, 1998; Shakespeare, 2008); this opens the fan to waft a wider wind of dialogical forensics with others' points of view, histories, and perspective of the world.

The Poets

Still, another challenge is that we may perceptually miscue pictures or images as common icons. By doing so, we may board an everyday rail by dropping common linguistic tokens into the turnstile of ideas (Bosch, 1998). As a result, we may travel nowhere new fast. This may be one reason why Jacob (1922), citing Ruskin, classified poets into four orders.

First, there are poets without feeling. These poets may truly see. Secondly, seeing untruly are poets who have strong feelings but whose thinking is not of the same magnitude. Third are poets who are strong human beings. However, this third group nonetheless yield to even stronger influences. Finally and rarest is the poet that sees the unimaginable and inconceivable. Are they prophetically inspired? (Jacob, 1922) or are the language and the poem speaking for them?

However, the indistinct lingual blink is only that, and without an explanation, our perception of an object—which may be a picture, a movement, a sound, or a sense of touch—is woefully incomplete (Bosch, 1998). However, an explanation may be difficult to achieve. This may be because, as Shusterman (1997) suggested, the perception of a thing is in part a noncognitive experience. In other words, the percipience of it may be "simply had but not known" (p. 161). In fact, the qualities of the thing, an objectification, are reached, and that is done in part with language (Shusterman, 1997).

Still, in perceiving the art, the child poet/philosopher may begin to only ramble through the garden variety common works. This is our first response in maintaining the seduction of our senses (Bosch, 1998).

The Art of Perception

However, there remains a vacuity between the perceived somatic and the art. In linguistic terms, perceptions essay a talk that in turn, possesses a language of its own and which continues to be cultivated (Bosch, 1998). After the child poet/philosopher scrambles for the first sentence, Bosch suggested that the second sentence is not as arduous to draft. She added that if we strive on, "our words will sustain our glance" (p. 43) at the work of art, just as even the first glance stirs us to cocoon the occasion in woven words.

Degas once asked Mallarme why he could not write the poems when he has so many ideas. Mallerme replies that poems are not made of ideas but of words (Valery, 1936).

Archiving Seduction

In chapter 14 of *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery,* Suki and Anne visit an art venue, The Frick Collection in New York City. Suki is recognized for her poetry in this and other P4C novels. Still, at the Frick, Suki moans that until it was explained to her by Anne, she saw paintings only as pretty things, much like jewelry (Lipman, 1985).

On the other hand, Degas once complained that even though as a painter he had ideas, he was still unable to address them in poetry (Jakobson, 1985d). This may be because, in essence, poetry is the poetic metamorphosis of normal oral discernment and the junction of sonic structure and meaning within language (Jakobson, 1985d). However, to get past our own disjunction, like Degas' own conflict between pictures and poetry, we must endure a period of image saturation before the need for language reemerges (Brook, 1972). After that, Bosch (1998) suggested that we "look aloud" as a way of mastering perceiving in the first place. Still, in an attempt to list certain artistic elements that appear to influence our appreciation of a piece, we may find that such a listing is insufficient to articulate our aesthetic appreciation. On the other hand, the list might be of use in exploring in a CI why comparable elements in other art do not affect us in the same way (Osborne, 1971).

It is through poetry that what Osborn (1971) calls the *connoisseur* may be able to describe these art qualities. In addition, Osborn's connoisseur makes extricable discernments and set impressions of reality as does this in art and in the subsequent poetry. The connoisseur also cautiously repudiates the untrue and the absent (Osborne, 1971). Through the poem of the connoisseur then, an artifact for meaning may be fixed, sustained, and transmitted (Bosch, 1998). The experience becomes a literary artifact and perhaps adds a better understanding for both the one who does the explaining and the ones receiving the explanation (Bosch, 1998), that is, the child poet/philosopher and other CI participants.

The Archive

An aspiration or direction to write a poem—having something to say—asks us to go into our busy archival garage and extract the germane facts, words, and records from other somatic dossiers (Bosch, 1998). However, we may also be asked to enter the archives of art, cultural history, and sacred places around us (UNESCO, 2005).

Szondi (1986), speaking of Schlegel, pointed out that the works of the ancients may have become only fragments but that the work of

contemporaries has developed because of this fossilization. With fragments, it may be possible to look into the future because it is the shards of an object that can seed new ideas providing the first satisfaction of a thirst for aesthetic synthesis (Szondi, 1986).

A context of interrelatedness between an apotheosis and the actual is the necessary substratum to make a shard of information useful. In the case of this discussion, the shard may be a curator's card on the wall near a particular painting. This shard or fragment might serve as a window for the child poet/philosopher to take a better look at the historically abstruse. In fact, the fragment might be a tonic for a new historical ardor (Szondi, 1986) that might lead to a new element of poetic thinking. However, the broader archive may be the hermeneutics of the lending library of any interaction with a text and language, which includes the dialogue of the CI. This unmasks our CI conveyance in the lingual lake, the somatic umiak of poetry.

Forms

As discussed, forms in poetry, music, and art that depict feelings are then called *presentational.* On the other hand, academic writing and the analytic thought involved may be called *discursive* (Langer, 1953; Lipman, 1956). However, these are just the forms. Then, there are the experiences. Some experiences may utterly baffle discursive form. Even so, a type of nondiscursive experience may actually escort every one of our discursive thoughts (Shusterman, 1997). These experiences may include the otherwise ineffable moments of emotion and aesthetic percipience. Condillac, cited by Coski (2006), suggested that the feelings of a person are required participants in that person's act of reason. Feelings or emotions may be part of the immutable that is captured in poetic thinking. As a result, poetic thinking and the poetry in language may not at all be subordinate to the discursive as others have suggested (Coski, 2006).

Shusterman (1997), speaking of Dewey, suggested that even an ineffable experience, as inscrutable as it is, may be discernible introspectively. Furthermore, the ineffable inferred is nonetheless a necessary component of all our thinking (Shusterman, 1997). To help reach a symbol that projects the ineffable, Langer (1942) suggested the presentational form. These presentational forms might include elements of typographic, sonic, sensory, and ideation manifestation (Turco, 1986). The sound, meter, and cadence of poetry are technically things you feel, and the typography is something you see, as is the poet reciting a poem.

In this chapter, I focus on how the poem may introduce the reader or listener to a sensory level (Turco, 1986). To evoke this somatic of the sensory level, a poet uses any number of trope types, which are otherwise known as *figures of speech.* Certain types of tropes, constructed linguistically, play to your ear or display images or movements to your eye. Also, movement may be presented toward other inner senses, such as vertigo and the tactile stimulus of touch or temperature. In other words, tropes appeal to the listeners' or readers' inner senses by way of mind pictures and often through description or imitation. The sensory level then also seems a reasonable step from visual art and its evocations, suggestions, and imitations of poetry.

Metaphor is also one of the tropes in Turco's (1986) sensory level and is often prevalent in children's poetry (Koch, 1970, 1973). Szondi (1986) suggested that metaphor is a twofold sphere of nature and myth. However, in the end, there is logic within metaphor, which is exclusive to the metaphor. This logic is part of the existence of a good poem, which results from a productive poetic process (Szondi, 1986).

As mentioned, sometimes in percipient seduction and the thinking that we do to archive it, we encounter abstract concepts (Bosch, 1998). These are difficult to embrace with a form or structure even if it is evoked by a preconceptual structure of the initial percipience. As a result, in a situation in which there seems to be no appreciable preconceptual structure or its subsequent form, we purport such through metaphor (Lakoff, 1987). In other words, metaphor may be one tool for grasping experiences within a domain developed from any somatic equivalents (Lakoff, 1987) or the preconceptual structures they may colonize (Kennedy, 2006).

This may support Langer's (1942) suggestion that presentational forms, such as metaphor, are, in fact, the earlier foundation of the discursive. Poetry is cradled deep within language. However, the important symbol form of poetry is not discursive but rather presentational. Poetry, a presentational form, is the ancient cinderblock foundation of the discursive structure (Langer, 1953). Generating presentational symbolism, although it is markedly different from other discursive cognition, is integral to the discursive and vice versa (Langer, 1942; Tremmel, 1992). One thing to add is that the poem, like the indistinct lingual blink describing to our seducer, the seduction itself, "should describe itself in every one of its descriptions. In other words the work is everywhere and simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry" (Szondi, 1986, p. 62). This might, by no choice of the poet, include most or all of Turco's (1986) previously mentioned form components.

Whereas the discursive is analytic, the linear, abstract, and representational are metaphoric, perceptory, and concrete; it may be clear that poetry and poetic thinking completely take part in the reasoning of people. This has occurred through the annals of language history and in the development of the same within children. The representational and the discursive both aid in the operation of a child's experience in thought and language (Tremmel, 1992). That may mean that poetic thinking and writing should be part of the operation of the mind, in that poetry is connected to the real and emotional wellspring of being human (Tremmel, 1992).

There may even be, in the poetry inspired by art within an art venue, the subtleties of the analogous mapping of the geometry of the visual arts through a grammatical structure and perhaps even the phonology of the poem (Jakobson, 1985a). This may be initiated by what Lakoff (1987) called a *preconceptual structure.* Preconceptual structures may be embodied within and linked to original somatic experience (Lakoff, 1987). Schlegel, as cited by Szondi (1986), suggested that even anomalous poetry forms may provide the important staple fiber and preliminary etude for the generation of a universal message. The universal will foster forth as long as there is content within the form, and both have an innovative, creative kinship (Szondi, 1986). Perhaps in this way, Stewart (1995) suggested, the poet is both "agent and vessel of sense perception" (p. 36). The agent is poet, percipient, and vessel because, as Shusterman (1997) submitted, bringing an experience into language morphs both into a brand new state of affairs, which is coalesced and ineffable.

Somatically, poetry evokes. Dickinson (1940), perhaps speaking to the mind/body reception of poetry, said, "If I read a book and it make my whole body so cold no fire can ever warm me, I know that its poetry. If I feel physically as if the top of head were taken off, I know that is poetry. These are the only ways I know it. Is there any other way?" Keats' (1931) own comments on poetics suggest that sensation and somatic memory are elements of a work of imagination. On the other hand, in speaking of Leonardo da Vinci, Cobbing (1978) mentioned that da Vinci once requested that a poet hand over something kinetic and visual, not simply auditory.

The art of interpreting and the art of creatively envisaging aesthetic meaning may be done through shared activity. In fact, poetry may be the language to begin the creative discourse (Alexander, 1992), perhaps precociously within a newborn CI. The poems then process, when mixed into language, as part of a perceptivity and begin a transitional perception within the CI (Alexander, 1992). The CI inquirers may address the

phenomenology of the inherent analogy or a likeness of their two-art experience: the visual and the verbal poetic. There may be a convergence of structure between the visual and the poem, which may then be addressed (Jakobson, 1985d) and open a hermeneutic outgrowth to follow further dialogue (Kennedy, 2006).

Words, such as *beauty, justice, courage,* and *happiness,* are commonly used in the P4C literature and CI discussions (Lipman, 1980, 2003; Lipman et al., 1980). However, where are their solidified definitions? Also, what about meaning? There seems to be no solid thought about that either (Arendt, 1978). This lack of the concrete for beauty, justice, and courage seems to be true for P4C professionals (Lipman, 1986, 2003; Lipman et al., 1980; Szondi, 1986). Then, how difficult must it be for children at the dawn of their thought/language development as well? Perhaps the innate nature of children is to use the more primary germs of the representational, such as poetry (Tremmel, 1992).

It would seem that the search for meaning is endeavored through poetry and prose and through philosophy (Hamrick, 1989). Feelings, details, and metaphor may slow down the process of coming to an understanding of the world. The discursive process may help this understanding speed through the process. However, something may be missing when the process is taken faster and not as a whole (Bosch, 1998; Tremmel, 1992).

The very tools used as representational symbols, Langer (1942, 1953) suggested, are forms of poetry. To confront the unacceptable, to understand the confounding, and to articulate that for which we have no words, children and their teachers need to use the representational along with the discursive and the academic along with the poetic. This may be true in the CI as well.

The Thing

The discursive attempts to glean the meaning of reality by standardizing, and thus managing it with the criterion of definition. Poetic thinking evinces the real by forming an interrelated expression of the thing with its own uniqueness (Bonnett, 1991). Poetic thinking, in other words, tries to comprehend a thing as it is and does not manipulate and categorize. Poetic thinking makes no assertion about the thing and instead is more straightforward and is affectively left as a presence in itself (Bonnett, 1991). Halliburton (1981) on Heidegger said that letting truth occur, the advent of verity of what something actually is, is the very essence of poetry.

However, there are things, and there are things. Some of the things can be works of art that appear vulgar and foster a blockage to aesthetic perceptivity. There may be at first a paradigmatic enmity for vulgarity. This may breed resistance to the attainment of an aesthetic perception thereof.

By the way, the exquisitely vulgar has its aesthete's sense as well. However, exquisitely vulgar images or language may not be the only blocks to aesthetic perceptivity. Images that are unfamiliar, idiosyncratic, or out of the box may not be allowed into the aesthetic perceptory of some because of a chosen abhorrence to our muffling comfort of the mechanical every day. Still, if a thing is uniformly vulgar, then Peirce, according to Osborne (1971), suggested that this should still be an esteem aesthetic because of its exquisite consistency.

Poetry and the Community

> An in-door life is less poetical;
> And out of door hath showers, and mists, and sleet,
> With which I could not brew on pastoral.
> But be it as it may, a bard must meet
> All difficulties, whether great or small,
> To spoil his undertaking or complete,
> And work away like spirit upon matter,
> Embarrass'd somewhat both with fire and water. (Byron, 2008)

Why would we take poetry to a CI from within the indoors to out of our personal doors to others? Perhaps because poetic thinking may be not only a way into a CI for thinkers to see the whole of a situation but also a way to strengthen the community. Poetic thinking may be an esteemed means of actually having a relationship with not only things but also other people. In relationships with people, for instance, Bonnett (1991) suggested that poetic thinking may be a natural occurrence and one that we often find preferable. Some relationship traits in particular even seem to be poetic. These might include the Eros of group involvement, or loving wholeheartedly, and addressing and responding to others as themselves rather than using or manipulating them. Of course, there is empathy as well as the poetics of group involvement.

The complete aesthetic appreciation of percipience may be aided by the expression of a discerned perception through poetry. This is because a poem created subsequent to an art viewing may, through its own aesthetic form, express a component of the original percipience (Osborne, 1971). The poem then brought to the CI table may begin another new inquiry of

the art and all of its cognitive evocations, as rendered in poetry. The central value of poetry then is that it may build on the meaning of the experiences of the child poet/philosopher and the reader (Graham, 1996).

Furthermore, as with the relationship between seeing and hearing, there is a reciprocal kinship between the speaker and the listener in what Stewart (1995) called a "community of receptivity." This might encompass the historical development of conflicted subjectivities (Stewart, 1995). In other words, how a poem is received in a CI will vary. This, of course, may also affect the presentation of the poem and maybe even the formation of the creative product. Still, in a CI, through the community receptivity, we disclose what Alexander (1992) called an "eco-ecology of democratic freedom" (p. 213), which is best fostered by way of an aesthetic that is pragmatic. This means that despite tragedy and conflict in the world, we seek to repossess a collective belief in a meaningful substance of existence. The conscious quest to fulfill this desire Alexander (1992) called the "Human Eros" (p. 203). Eros also may be a CI component (Kennedy, 1994).

What you stew after the poetry experience, what product is produced, may even stir more of an evocation than the situation itself (Bosch, 1998). That, Dewey (1997) suggested, is because at the very moment of perception and experience the poet lives "moment to moment, preoccupied with the task at hand" (ew 12.18). However, later as the memories congeal into thoughts "a drama emerges," complete with a beginning, middle and climax of the encounter (ew. 12.18; Bosch, 1998). Perhaps these are philosophical stories.

Mind/Body/Text Osmosis and the Intertextual Umiak

Like a cell with a membrane and nucleus, the mind and body may be a porous entity within an intertextual swamp. Heidegger (1971) added that chafing across the regions of the earth is a chaotic but nonetheless canny colloquy of words in various modern media, which forms its own navigation of the swamp. In such a fluid mush of text, the mind/body is continually constructed and reconstructed. This Fleckenstein (1999) called "somatic mind," which allows us to incarnate our communication without one or the other, body or mind, totally dominating. Our continual, developing relationship between the carnal and the textual in part creates our somatic mind.

Without permeability to our intertextual ecosphere, we may become a voiceless collection of cells. Even within the CI ecosphere, our personal identity is a muscled manifestation, a frame of flesh, that evaporates and

amalgamates by reacting to and being in context with "invisible inter-textual messages" (Fleckenstein, 1999, p. 303). Because we are somatic minds then, writing poetically will help us communicate and begin an inquiry. The tool is poetry because although we are permeable in one way, we also have no border that divides word and image, body and mind. We possess only a process of osmosis (Fleckenstein, 2003). A poem may give a framework,

Word Play

Like corporeal cognition in an interlingual lake, a big part of what helps us create a new poem is not just, according to Jung (2001), intellectual. However, to a great extent, creating something new is also a type of play. This, Jung said, utilizes the play instinct. In art, as in toys and games, we play with the objects that we love (Robinson, 2001). This seems to include language as well.

Ciardi (1975) told a related story about Auden. Auden, we are told, said that in advising young poets, he would first ask why the person wanted to write poetry. If the reply was "because I have something important to say," Auden would infer that this kid would not be successful. If, however, the answer was "because I like to hang around words and overhear them talking to each other," then the poet-to-be may have a stake at success (p. 3). That might be because this kind of playing with words is one of the rudiments of the art.

The play with words may encompass many poetry forms, and it is with these forms that the *how* of a meaning explication is generated. *How* a poem, or painting for that matter, means is *en suit* to *what* it means (Robinson, 2001). In fact, these forms help supply a framework to move creativity successfully out to play (Ciardi, 1975).

We need a field with boundaries perhaps to play. Poems may be an actual output of schematic symbols, in that the forms of the poems connote some of their meaning (Robinson, 2001). In other words, an uttered lyric incorporates a kinetic link between a declaration of the poet's will and what the utterance means somatically as well as linguistically (Stewart, 1995).

This somatic component may be part of what ties poetry directly to paintings and other art forms. This may be because in painting we garner meaning from forms as well. Certainly, we do not buy the *Encyclopedia of Color* on ebay to research exactly what turquoise and verdant green commonly mean (Robinson, 2001). We must perceive the meaning another way. In fact, meaning may have many potentialities through

aesthetic discernment. However, when these meanings come to be, creatively and cooperatively, through the art of living, then maybe we have reached wisdom (ew 3.5; Dewey, 1997).

Some Form of Play

Play in the school curriculum, of course, has its place; unfortunately, in common language, use the idea of *form*, a category of the poetic play, seems to be set far aside from the idea of substance. An example might be when we say "the *form* of the professor's colloquium talk seemed quite scattered, out of form, but the *substance* was very relevant to our interests" (Maquet, 1990). In this way, a vocal form might suggest a shallow façade. Although substance or the ever valuable content is really the important element, form may not be as important, just a trivial trick of semantics (Maquet, 1990).

However, that is how we might separate form and substance in speech. Form for painters, on the other hand, is the most important part of their aesthetic palette, not a superficial smudge. Still, as sound is to music and visual form is to painting, the metric form of poetry likewise is also not a façade, nor are its sound and typographic suggestions (Maquet, 1990).

The Type of Play

In addition to meaning in sound, there is a visual impact in written or printed poetry. Even the typography of a poem may carry meaning in its form. As art demonstrates the ocular interest of its makers as well, the poetry evoked by this art may show the concerns of the poem's maker, the child poet/philosopher. In addition, Maquet (1990) suggested that this kind of poetry form may demonstrate the "visual capacity of the beholders to perceive formal order in the varied idioms of different styles" (pp. 56–57). Of course, the typographic form may also support or supplement a form in meter, rhyme, or cadence. The visual may be proportioned aesthetically and meaningfully to the language.

Somatic

Beyond this, the "poetic delight," which is evoked through the structure of a poem's language and sound, may be of a proportion that can be a somatic precept; this may lead to further poetic action and response (Jakobson, 1985a). Hlobil (2000), speaking of Baumgaten, suggested that words are, in fact, a reality perceived through our senses, and this can thus

affect the mind, perhaps in a somatic fashion. Dewey, according to Shusterman (1997), seemed to recognize art's "deep roots in life's needs and interests [by incorporating] the practical and cognitive, along with the somatic and social as contributing elements in aesthetic experience?" (p. 6). As suggested by Thomas Aquinas, "the senses delight in things duly proportioned as in something akin to them; for, the sense, too, is a kind of reason as is every cognitive power" (Jakobson, 1985a, p. 45).

Somatically, poetry evokes. Dickinson (1940) said:

> If I read a book and it makes my whole body so cold no fire can ever warm me, I know that is poetry. If I feel physically as if the top of head were taken off, I know that is poetry. These are the only ways I know it. Is there any other way? (p. 366)

Dickinson seemed to speak to the mind/body reception of poetry.

Inseparable, as well, are intuition and the somatic mechanics of poetics in that each nourishes the other. As mentioned, the synergy of the meaning of such a poem is the business not what of the poem means but rather how the poem might mean (Ciardi, 1975). Ciardi suggested that no CI will concur on the precise meaning of a poem. However, what the poem means and the process thereof constitutes a discussion that might proceed with more success; this perhaps reduces some of the frustration possible in a CI. These frustrations, like little tokens of possible truth, may literally fall out of a discussion of the poetic technicalities.

The Somatic, Sonic Evocation

One technicality may be the sound of the poem. Partly, this is because language itself is composed of sound and meaning. Working as a duo, sound and meaning may have the ability to function in an infinite realm of possibility (Chomsky, 2006). The sound of some poetry may reach toward the goal of a meaning that may also emit from it. That may be partly because a recited poem is mainly a muscular maneuver. A poem and its sound forms may be a puissant sonic utterance. This may not always be true of words in print. By listening to the recited poem, we may actually occupy the gallery of noise and let the poem say itself through the body. Totally somatic, "poetry then is a physical occurrence which the body liberates" (Cobbing, 1978, p. 33), and when bodies collaborate in movement and music, the result may even touch on ritual.

If when a poet generates a poem and waves are propelled from the body as Rukeyser (1996) may suggest, whose body is it? It seems that there might be a surrogate for the poet's body. Polanyi (1993) claimed that

the perception of things apart from the body serves as surrogate experiences of the body. As a result, it may seem as if their meaning is transposed away from us. This may be what Polanyi (1983) called "tacit knowledge." Within a CI, the tacit knowledge of a presented poem may be astonishing.

The Sound, Silence

Speaking of Heidegger, Halliburton (1981) suggested that what has already been spoken and what will be spoken share an inarticulate consanguinity with what is actually being spoken. This blood relationship of sorts occurs through what is, in fact, unspoken. That is because the situation of this relationship is enacted autonomously to human circumstance. The consanguinity of what was said, will be said, and is being said is, in essence, altogether unsaid. The unsaid correlates to and attains the spatiotemporal presence of language because it provides a situation for further spoken sentences of meaning (Halliburton, 1981).

Meter

The meter of a poem, the achievement of which requires part silence and part sound, may suggest meaning as well. This may be because meter carries its own structural history and its own temporal character. Meter evolves in time. Its sonic clock, by will or sonic suggestion, lets meter tend to accumulate its own parsed allusions (Stewart, 1995). In fact, the music or meter of a poem may possess its own language, purport, or meaning. However, this purport may be successfully evoked by the writer or reader at any time in the history of the poem's interception or recollection or not at all. This means that the purport of meter may not be presently noticed or even seen as missing to consciousness at any particular time (Stewart, 1995).

In *Poetics 1447.I.23*, Aristotle (2000) asserted that although the forms that may be combined into a poem are several; these elements of a poem must work in combination to form a whole (McKeon, 1947). We have explored the spoken, the unspoken, and the meter of a poem in this section. It may be that a poem then is the sum of its parts, a whole because the poem is not just its text. This may be what the schematic encoding of the poem generates (Robinson, 2001).

Discussion

I think that the literature and curriculum direction for the development of poetry from the percipience of visual arts leading to philosophical dialogue within a CI are limited. I suggest future work first on the development of a percipience curriculum to be used particularly within art galleries and museums accessible to school districts. This type of program has made a start with P4C affiliates. The Institute of Research for the Teaching of Philosophy (GrupIREF) in Barcelona, Spain, has explored philosophy through visual arts in out-of-the-classroom venues, such as the National Museum of Art of Catalonia (Bosch, 1998; dePuig, personal communication, 2008). A full curriculum for use in U.S. schools and around the world may be developed with some inspiration from Bosch and dePuig.

Second, a curriculum component of the percipience of art might then lead to a dialogue about poetic thinking further based on the recognition of this cognition in everyday life.

I suggest that poetic thinking might lead to artifact development or the preservation of percipient seduction through the writing of poetry. This may open many new windows for philosophical discussion when the poems are then used as fodder for cultivation of the CI dialogue.

I find that in my own experience with middle school students, some clear direction to move students toward the possible poetry form will open up possibilities outside the first response utterances. Although some of the forms as discussed are, according to some, indigenous to the poetic mind, learning what some of them look like up front may open up a window to this aesthetic otherwise trapped by an over focus on the discursive (Jakobson, 1985b).

Finally, with the transitional object of poetry—one step on the umiak trip across (Gazzaniga, 2008) the interlingual aqua sphere from percipience to poetic thinking to poetry writing—much of the current P4C curriculum for the development of a CI may be implemented or adapted. This somatic enterprise into the thinking mind of the child poet/philosopher may then further support and be supported by the wider views of the various CI communities within the community (Kennedy, 1994).

However, the main reason for percipience, poetic thinking, and then poetry in a CI umiak is that in addition to the swamp of the intertextual, questions of philosophy do not exist by themselves or sit there ready to be taken off the shelf like a choice purchase. Instead, the question arises through perceptions, observations, and experiences. Once a question

begins to congeal after or during the process of its manifestation, expectations or their token languages may begin to hatch. These hatchling expectations are not always of the same species to all participants in a CI, particularly when there are adults in the group as well as children (van der Leeuw, 1987).

By displaying her expectations or even new ideas outside of the easily spoken language, the child poet/philosopher may enter the inquiry process. That process may then be available to the CI group through the reading of such a poem.

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Note

1. In this chapter, Dewey (1997), an electronic version of *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953,* is cited with a URL in the references. Text citations that begin with a lowercase *ew* are followed by a numeric indicator with

decimal point numbers (e.g., ew 2.173) and direct the reader to the precise online page and section numbers. This is used only for phrases directly quoted from this source. In all other cases, the citations for this particular source are made in a standard manner (e.g., Dewey, 1997).